A detailed analysis of the Money Message Ransomware

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Executive summary

The threat actor group, Money Message ransomware, first appeared in March 2023, demanding million-dollar ransoms from its targets. Its configuration, which contains the services and processes to stop a ransomware attack, can be found at the end of the executable. The ransomware creates a mutex and deletes the Volume Shadow Copies using vssadmin.exe.

The files are encrypted using the ChaCha20 algorithm, with the key being encrypted using ECDH (Elliptic-curve Diffie-Hellman). The extension of the encrypted files isn't changed, however the structure of the files indicates they were encrypted.

Analysis and findings

SHA256: 8be41efd6e6ace53b8c59344be2ba91fe41003987a8e38484b20760d7c400a42

The malware decrypts a list of arguments that it can run with: "--crypt", "-d", "-l", and "-v". We'll explain the purpose of each argument in our analysis.



Figure 1

The messages that would be displayed in the console are decrypted using the same SUB instruction (see Figure 2).



Figure 2

The ransomware retrieves the current system date and time via a function call to GetSystemTimePreciseAsFileTime:

Figure 3

The GetCurrentThreadId API is utilized to obtain the ID of the calling thread:



Figure 4

The process writes relevant strings in the console by calling the WriteConsoleA method:

Figure 5

It extracts information about the console screen buffer using GetConsoleScreenBufferInfo:



Figure 6

The malware changes the text color for output using the SetConsoleTextAttribute function (0x2 = **FOREGROUND_GREEN**):

Figure 7

The executable file is opened by calling the wfsopen method (0x40 = **_SH_DENYNO**):

Figure 8

The binary is looking for its configuration by reading 4096 bytes at a time:

Figure 9

The configuration contains the ransom note content, the mutex name, a list of directories that will be skipped, the public key, a list of processes and services to stop, a list of corporate credentials previously extracted from the victim, and the temporary extension:



Address	Hex	ASCII
05342840	7B 0D 0A 20 20 20 20 22 69 6E 66 6F 5F 74 65 78	{.. "info_tex
05342850	74 5F 6D 65 73 73 61 67 65 22 3A 20 22 57 57 39	t_message": "WW9
05342860	31 63 69 42 6D 61 57 78 6C 63 79 42 33 59 58 4D	1ciBmaWxlcyB3YXM
05342870	67 5A 57 35 6A 63 6E 6C 77 64 47 56 6B 49 47 4A	gZW5jcnlwdGVkIGJ
05342880	35 49 43 4A 4E 62 32 35 6C 65 53 42 74 5A 58 4E	5ICJNb25leSBtZXN
05342890	7A 59 57 64 6C 49 69 42 77 63 6D 39 6D 61 58 52	zYWdlIiBwcm9maXR
053428A0	68 59 6D 78 6C 49 47 39 79 5A 32 46 75 61 58 70	hYmxlIG9yZ2FuaXp
053428B0	68 64 47 6C 76 62 69 41 67 59 57 35 6B 49 47 4E	hdGlvbiAgYW5kIGN
053428C0	68 62 69 64 30 49 47 4A 6C 49 47 46 6A 59 32 56	hbid0IGJlIGFjY2V
053428D0	7A 63 32 56 6B 49 47 46 75 65 57 31 76 63 6D 55	zc2VkIGFueW1vcmU
053428E0	75 44 51 6F 4E 43 6B 6C 6D 49 48 6C 76 64 53 42	uDQoNCklmIHlvdSB
053428F0	77 59 58 6B 67 63 6D 46 75 63 32 39 74 4C 43 42	wYXkgcmFuc29tLCB
05342900	35 62 33 55 67 64 32 6C 73 62 43 42 6E 5A 58 51	5b3Ugd2lsbCBnZXQ
05342910	67 59 53 42 6B 5A 57 4E 79 65 58 42 30 62 33 49	gYSBkZWNyeXB0b3I
05342920	67 64 47 38 67 5A 47 56 6A 63 6E 6C 77 64 43 42	gdG8gZGVjcnlwdCB
05342930	30 61 47 56 74 4C 69 42 45 62 32 34 6E 64 43 42	0aGVtLiBEb24ndCB
05342940	30 63 6E 6B 67 64 47 38 67 5A 47 56 6A 63 6E 6C	0cnkgdG8gZGVjcnl
05342950	77 64 43 42 6D 61 57 78 6C 63 79 42 35 62 33 56	wdCBmaWxlcyB5b3V
05342960	79 63 32 56 73 5A 69 41 74 49 47 6C 75 49 48 52	yc2VsZiAtIGluIHR

Figure 10

Figure 11

The directories extracted from the “skip_directories” field are Base64-decoded (Figure 12).



Figure 12

The ransomware creates a mutex called “12345-12345-12235-12354”, which ensures that only one copy is running at a single time:

Figure 13

It opens the “ServicesActive” database using the OpenSCManagerW API (0x80000000 = **GENERIC_READ**):



Figure 14

The malicious binary obtains a list of all services that run in their own processes using EnumServicesStatusExW (0x10 = **SERVICE_WIN32_OWN_PROCESS**, 0x3 = **SERVICE_STATE_ALL**):



Figure 15

The following services will be stopped:

- "vss" "sql" "svc$" "memtas" "mepocs" "sophos" "veeam" "backup" "vmms"

```
.text:00F015DB
.text:00F015DB loc_F015DB:
.text:00F015DB lea     eax, [ebp+ServiceStatus]
.text:00F015DE mov     [ebp+var_2C], 0
.text:00F015E5 push    eax             ; lpServiceStatus
.text:00F015E6 mov     eax, [ebp+var_50]
.text:00F015E9 xorps   xmm0, xmm0
.text:00F015EC push    SERVICE_CONTROL_STOP ; dwControl
.text:00F015EE movups  xmmword ptr [ebp+ServiceStatus.dwServiceType], xmm0
.text:00F015F2 movups  xmmword ptr [ebp+ServiceStatus.dwServiceSpecificExitCode], xmm0
.text:00F015F6 push    dword ptr [eax] ; hService
.text:00F015F8 call    ds:ControlService
.text:00F015FE test    eax, eax
.text:00F01600 jnz     short loc_F01617
```

Figure 16

The malware takes a snapshot of all processes via a call to CreateToolhelp32Snapshot (0x2 = **TH32CS_SNAPPROCESS**):



Figure 17

The processes are enumerated using the Process32FirstW and Process32NextW APIs, as shown below:

Figure 18



Figure 19

The ransomware opens the target processes using the OpenProcess method (0x1 = **PROCESS_TERMINATE**):

Figure 20

The following processes will be killed:

- "sql.exe" "oracle.exe" "ocssd.exe" "dbsnmp.exe" "synctime.exe" "agntsvc.exe" "isqlplussvc.exe" "xfssvccon.exe" "mydesktopservice.exe" "ocautoupds.exe" "encsvc.exe" "firefox.exe" "tbirdconfig.exe" "mdesktopqos.exe" "ocomm.exe" "dbeng50.exe" "sqbcoreservice.exe" "excel.exe" "infopath.exe" "msaccess.exe" "mspub.exe" "onenote.exe" "outlook.exe" "powerpnt.exe" "steam.exe" "thebat.exe" "thunderbird.exe" "visio.exe" "winword.exe" "wordpad.exe" "vmms.exe" "vmwp.exe"



Figure 21

The following directories will not be encrypted:

- "C:\msocache" "C:\$windows.~ws" "C:\system volume information" "C:\perflogs" "C:\programdata" "C:\program files (x86)" "C:\program files" "C:\$windows.~bt" "C:\windows" "C:\windows.old" "C:\boot"

The executable retrieves a pseudo handle for the process, as highlighted in Figure 22.



Figure 22

IsWow64Process is used to determine if the process is running on a 64-bit architecture:

Figure 23

The ransomware disables file system redirection for the current thread (see Figure 24).

Figure 24

It deletes all Volume Shadow Copies using the vssadmin.exe tool:

Figure 25

A new thread is created, which runs the sub_ED2770 function even if the argument passed to CreateThread is the StartAddress function:

Figure 26

Figure 27

Thread activity – sub_ED2770 function

The LookupPrivilegeValueA API is utilized to obtain the LUID for the following privileges: "SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege", "SeRestorePrivilege", and "SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege":

Figure 28

The executable opens the access token associated with the current process (0xF01FF = **TOKEN_ALL_ACCESS**):

Figure 29

The process enables all the privileges mentioned above by calling the AdjustTokenPrivileges method, as highlighted below:

Figure 30

The ransomware retrieves a list of sessions on the machine using WTSEnumerateSessionsW (Figure 31).



Figure 31

For each of the identified sessions, the malware obtains the access token of the logged-on user:

Figure 32

The DuplicateTokenEx method is used to create an impersonation token that duplicates the above token (0x2 = **SecurityImpersonation**, 0x2 = **TokenImpersonation**):

Figure 33

The malicious binary creates a new thread that will identify the shared resources. The credentials extracted from the configuration will be used to access those shares.

Figure 34

Thread activity – sub_F179D0 function

The executable extracts a pseudo handle for the current thread:



Figure 35

SetThreadToken is utilized to assign the impersonation token to the current thread, as displayed in Figure 36.

Figure 36

The ransomware starts enumerating all currently connected resources via a function call to WNetOpenEnumW (0x1 = **RESOURCE_CONNECTED**):

Figure 37

The enumeration continues using the WNetEnumResourceW API (see Figure 38). The malware is looking for files to encrypt in these network resources.

Figure 38

We continue to analyze the main thread.

The process iterates over drives in the range “Z:” to “A:” and calls the GetDriveTypeW method:

Figure 39

For each of the identified drives, the ransomware calls the CreateFileW function (0x80 = **FILE_READ_ATTRIBUTES**, 0x7 = **FILE_SHARE_DELETE** | **FILE_SHARE_WRITE** | **FILE_SHARE_READ**, 0x3 = **OPEN_EXISTING**, 0x02000000 = **FILE_FLAG_BACKUP_SEMANTICS**):

Figure 40

The binary obtains the final path for the drives by calling the GetFinalPathNameByHandleW API:



Figure 41

It extracts information about the current system using GetNativeSystemInfo (see Figure 42).

Figure 42

The ransomware creates the ransom note called “money_message.log” in every drive. The file contains the chat ID that is specific to a victim and can be used to contact the threat actor:



Figure 43



Figure 44

The malware creates a new thread that handles the files encryption:

Figure 45

Thread activity – sub_F1D1C0 function

The ransomware opens the directory to encrypt using CreateFileW, as shown in the figure below.

Figure 46

The files are enumerated using the FindFirstFileExW and FindNextFileW functions:

Figure 47

Figure 48

The following files will not be encrypted:

- "desktop.ini" "ntuser.dat" "thumbs.db" "iconcache.db" "ntuser.ini" "ntldr" "bootfont.bin" "ntuser.dat.log" "bootsect.bak" "boot.ini" "autorun.inf"

The malware retrieves attributes for a file to be encrypted by calling the GetFileAttributesExW method:

Figure 49

The ECDH public key used is hard-coded in the executable "71828bcd92dd7f5950841835ed0fc926a7f6888be7af4fc07ddc06dd8a1e6400bf3ad4cc27083aade393c5262570bcbf47aa9855fb9ecc0c82be053c8d95f974a1f2e32d8005e7059461b1e958fecd7dbc1fa36bf9f9bc8746d431902fe990772d16bab1e779dbe62654440100117 08d1091df3838c0a15b0ccf99db70e951a74670dd05eb719678d62d150edee22706".

CryptAcquireContextA is utilized to acquire a handle to a key container within a cryptographic service provider (0x1 = **PROV_RSA_FULL**, 0xF0000040 = **CRYPT_VERIFYCONTEXT** | **CRYPT_SILENT**):

Figure 50

CSPRNG is used to generate 0x48 random bytes. These bytes, together with the ECDH public key, will be used to generate the shared secret.



Figure 51



Figure 52

The shared secret generated between the public key and the random bytes is 144 bytes long. The elliptic curve is P-384 for the ECDH algorithm.



Figure 53



Figure 54



Figure 55

The SHA384 algorithm implementation is shown in Figure 56. The process computes the hash of the shared secret and copies the first 32 resulting bytes to a new buffer. These bytes represent the ChaCha20 key that will be used to encrypt the file. The nonce (16 bytes) is randomly generated using the same library.

```
.text:00F397F0 mov     [ebp+var_D8], 80000000h
.text:00F397FA movaps  xmm0, ds:xmmword_F84C40
.text:00F39801 mov     [ebp+var_D4], 80008000h
.text:00F3980B mov     [ebp+var_D0], 80000000h
.text:00F39815 mov     [ebp+var_CC], 808Bh
.text:00F3981F mov     [ebp+var_C8], 0
.text:00F39829 mov     [ebp+var_C4], 80000001h
.text:00F39833 mov     [ebp+var_C0], 0
.text:00F3983D mov     [ebp+var_BC], 80008081h
.text:00F39847 mov     [ebp+var_B8], 80000000h
.text:00F39851 mov     [ebp+var_B4], 8009h
.text:00F3985B mov     [ebp+var_B0], 80000000h
.text:00F39865 mov     [ebp+var_AC], 8Ah ; 'Š'
.text:00F3986F mov     [ebp+var_A8], 0
.text:00F39879 mov     [ebp+var_A4], 88h ; 'ˆ'
.text:00F39883 mov     [ebp+var_A0], 0
.text:00F3988D mov     [ebp+var_9C], 80008009h
.text:00F39897 mov     [ebp+var_98], 0
.text:00F398A1 mov     [ebp+var_94], 8000000Ah
.text:00F398AB mov     [ebp+var_90], 0
.text:00F398B5 mov     [ebp+var_8C], 8000808Bh
.text:00F398BF mov     [ebp+var_88], 0
.text:00F398C9 mov     [ebp+var_84], 8Bh ; '‹'
.text:00F398D3 mov     [ebp+var_80], 80000000h
.text:00F398DA mov     [ebp+var_7C], 8089h
.text:00F398E1 mov     [ebp+var_78], 80000000h
.text:00F398E8 mov     [ebp+var_74], 8003h
.text:00F398EF mov     [ebp+var_70], 80000000h
.text:00F398F6 mov     [ebp+var_6C], 8002h
.text:00F398FD mov     [ebp+var_68], 80000000h
.text:00F39904 mov     [ebp+var_64], 80h ; '€'
.text:00F3990B mov     [ebp+var_60], 80000000h
.text:00F39912 mov     [ebp+var_5C], 800Ah
.text:00F39919 mov     [ebp+var_58], 0
.text:00F39920 mov     [ebp+var_54], 8000000Ah
.text:00F39927 mov     [ebp+var_50], 80000000h
.text:00F3992E mov     [ebp+var_4C], 80008081h
.text:00F39935 mov     [ebp+var_48], 80000000h
.text:00F3993C mov     [ebp+var_44], 8080h
.text:00F39943 mov     [ebp+var_40], 80000000h
.text:00F3994A mov     [ebp+var_3C], 80000001h
.text:00F39951 mov     [ebp+var_38], 0
.text:00F39958 mov     [ebp+var_34], 80008008h
.text:00F3995F mov     [ebp+var_30], 80000000h
```

Figure 56

The binary creates an intermediary file by adding the “cbgnfvn” string at the end of the filename (0xC0000000 = **GENERIC_READ** | **GENERIC_WRITE**, 0x3 = **FILE_SHARE_READ** | **FILE_SHARE_WRITE**, 0x3 = **OPEN_EXISTING**, 0x80 = **FILE_ATTRIBUTE_NORMAL**):

Figure 57

The GetFileType method is utilized to obtain the file type:

Figure 58

The ransomware moves the file pointer to the beginning of the file (0x0 = **FILE_BEGIN**):



Figure 59

The file content is read via a function call to ReadFile (see Figure 60).



Figure 60

The content is encrypted using the ChaCha20 algorithm:



Figure 61



Figure 62

The encrypted file content is written back to the file using WriteFile (Figure 63).

Figure 63

The encrypted files extension is changed back to the original after the encryption is complete. The operation is done using MoveFileExW (0x3 = **MOVEFILE_COPY_ALLOWED** | **MOVEFILE_REPLACE_EXISTING**):

Figure 64

The ChaCha20 key is encrypted using ECDH and written to the encrypted file. The ChaCha20 nonce is stored in a non-encrypted form:



Figure 65

Running with the --crypt parameter

The malware only encrypts the directory passed as the argument.

Running with the -d parameter

In this case, the ransomware doesn't stop the target services and processes and doesn't delete the Volume Shadow Copies.

Running with the -l parameter

The process creates a log file called “encrypt_log.txt” that stores the messages written to the console.

Running with the -v parameter

This is the verbose mode that displays all the intermediary steps during the malware’s execution:



Figure 66

Indicators of Compromise

SHA256

8be41efd6e6ace53b8c59344be2ba91fe41003987a8e38484b20760d7c400a42

Money Message Ransom Note

money_message.log

Mutex

12345-12345-12235-12354

Process spawned

cmd.exe /c vssadmin.exe delete shadows /all /quiet